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Introduction
In biological and biomedical research, the vast majority of resources
are focused on conducting experiments. Most of these experiments
utilize animals. Only a tiny amount of resources is spent on theory and
modeling. It is our contention and the basic theme of this paper that
the imbalance between theory and experiment in biology produces very
poor science. The implications of which are that many of the experiments
conducted have little real scientific meaning or value and, therefore, go
hand-in-hand with unnecessary animal use and suffering. Given the
finite resources available for research, the redirection of significant
resources from an almost entirely experimental approach into one with
an emphasis on more theoretical and modeling activity will achieve a
much better scientific result while considerably reducing the number
of animals used in biological research.
Although the arguments developed here have a bearing on other
issues as well, such as the optimum use of resources, future directions
in the training of research biologists, etc., they have a very direct bearing
on the rising awareness that the indiscriminant use of animals for any
purely human purpose needs to be carefully reexamined. Without getting
into the moral questions of whether animal research is justifiable (see
Singer 1985), we will attempt, in this paper, to analyze the current
philosophical structure of a field which consumes animals at a high rate.
203
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For these reasons, it is important for everyone to have some understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of modern biological
research-its history, its present, and its future. This paper focuses on
the relationship between experiment and theory in biology and the role
that modeling plays in the quality and strength of this interaction. It
concludes with a discussion of a relatively recent development, Network
Thermodynamics. We believe that Network Thermodynamic modeling
and computer simulation is the next step in providing a comprehensive
theoretical framework for describing complex, hierarchical biological
systems and will have a profound impact on the future of biology.

The Scientific Method: Theory and Empiricism
Empiricism is distinct from other epistemologies (theories of knowledge) in its almost total reliance on sense experience as the ultimate
source of knowledge. As an approach to science, it represents the search
for knowledge based solely on experiment and observation. Much attention is therefore focused on methods for collecting and processing data
with the inherent belief that this collecting activity will lead to recognition of patterns and relationships between observed events and ultimately to our understanding of the laws of nature (Mahoney 1976). In
contrast to this completely experimental approach, there is what we
will call "theoretical deduction" which is based upon the ability of the
human mind to deduce relationships between abstract, often seemingly
unreal or imaginary entities, usually represented by mathematics. This
is the completely theoretical approach and as a scientific methodology
seeks to gain knowledge by reasoning from known principles to an
unknown or by seeking a set of general principles which can then be
applied to explain the specific. Its language is mathematics.
The strength of empiricism lies in its concrete attachment to the
physical reality of the system being studied. Its weaknesses become
more apparent and severe as the complexity of the system increases.
In biological systems, for instance, where we often face multiple interactive, dynamic, nonlinear processes embedded within complex structures,
it becomes virtually impossible to intuit the basic principles and theoretical framework by which the system operates from just "looking at the
relationships" in the data. In fact, without a theoretical framework to
start from, it is highly unlikely that the "critical" experiments necessary
to eventually achieve understanding will even be performed. On the
opposite side, theoretical deduction can provide the rigorous mathemati-
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cal framework for the development of basic principles leading to understanding. The weakness of disembodied theorizing, however, is the risk of
total irrelevance, i.e., the mathematical formalism of the theory has little
or nothing to do with the actual structures and processes in the system.
Given the match of the strengths and weaknesses of these two
approaches, it should not be too surprising that the scientific method
frequently offered as the best and most productive comes from the
strong interaction of theory with experiment (Platt 1964; Murphy 1982).
This brings us to the concept of a model. Jaynes (1976) tells us that
the concepts of science are all concrete metaphors which serve to generate abstract concepts. He distinguishes between a theory and a model
by pointing to the theory as a relationship of the model to the things
a model is supposed to represent. For example, Bohr modeled the atom
to resemble a miniature solar system. The theory would state all atoms
are represented by this model. This may seem a subtle distinction and
is certainly a subjective one, but nevertheless a useful one. Thus modeling may be thought of as the vehicle for the interaction between theory
and experiment.

Classification of Models
It is important to realize that all biologists use models in formulating
and interpreting experiments, whether or not they are consciously aware
of it. Many models never become formulated beyond the state of pictures,
diagrams or even merely being verbalized. Such inherently intuitive
and nonanalytical descriptions we will simply call qualitative models.
Models which involve specific mathematical descriptions will be divided
into two main categories: empirical models and theory-directed models.
By empirical, we mean a mathematical description of the input-output
characteristics of a system that is not based on or derived from the
actual structures and/or specific processes of that system. Empirical
models are basically models of data and may be thought of as essentially
either "black box" approaches or curve-fitting. Theory-directed models,
on the other hand, are an attempt to mathematically describe the
physical reality of a biological system at a sufficient level of complexity
necessary to explain system behavior. While theory-directed models
may have some empirical elements within them, they are ultimately
directed towards developing a comprehensive theoretical framework for
understanding both the holistic behavior of the system and the specific
behavior and contribution of each of the component parts of the system.
As opposed to models of data, theory-directed models are more models
of systems and are sometimes capable of telling us something very
important about reality without any specific experimental data. This
is, obviously, the point of departure from pure empiricism.
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Criteria for Judging Models
If models are the vehicle for the interaction between theory and
experiment, then the "quality" of the model becomes critical to the
quality of the science produced. It becomes very important, therefore,
to understand in a general sense the strengths and weaknesses of these
three categories of models.
A model should be communicable since science is a community
activity. Qualitative models, particularly the diagrammatic and pictorial
ones, certainly have this quality. They are also simple to formulate and
use and easy to alter. These qualities may have something to do with
their being the most common type of model used in biological research.
As the systems they describe become more complex, serious problems
arise with their specificity, clarity, and rigor. At times, we are asked to
help an experimentalist develop a theory-directed type of model to
replace the qualitative model that they have been using. We typically
find that the processes and mechanisms alluded to in their qualitative
model do not have clear and specific descriptions. Quite often we also
find that necessary intermediate steps have been completely left out
or essentially ignored, although these steps may play an important role
in regulating the overall system behavior. The biggest weakness with
qualitative models is that they are untested (except perhaps in the
mind of their developer). In other words, it is never demonstrated that
a particular model can actually produce the type of behavior that it is
supposed to explain, let alone make accurate predictions about the
system's behavior under new conditions. An excellent example of this
problem was shown by Eisenfeld and DeLisi (1984). They examined, on
the basis of qualitative stability and instability, a number of qualitative
models in the literature which described immune response regulation.
Not too surprisingly, they found that a number of apparently plausible
models were unstable and therefore were not viable models for the
observed behavior. Thus qualitative models tend to produce a weak or
nonexistent interaction between theory and experiment.
Empirical models are for the most part readily communicable and
not too difficult to use or modify, although they are less so than qualitative models. Unlike qualitative models, they possess at least mathematical rigor in their definitions and descriptions and they are testable.
They are good at codifying and organizing in a rigorous way the data
sets for a particular system. For example, measurements are made
under a given set of conditions and the data is used to calculate a
number of parameters in the model. The experimental conditions are
changed, new measurements are made, and again the particular
parameters are calculated. How these parameters change under different conditions establishes a uniform way of discussing and analyzing the
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data between different labs investigating the same system. There are
a number of weaknesses with this type of model. The first is that these
parameters do not relate to the specific physical reality of the system.
Some of the mathematical techniques used in this type of model (for
example, compartmental analysis and equivalent circuit analysis) have
a real physical interpretation in some very simple systems. In more
complex systems, however, they no longer correlate with real physical
parameters. Unfortunately, there is still the tendency to blur or ignore
the original assumptions and incorrectly give these parameters a literal
physical meaning. Second, since the parameters do not map one for
one with the real system, there is usually a great deal of hidden information (the real variables of the system) buried in these parameters.
This is why these models cannot be used to accurately predict system
performance under new conditions but only to codify data between
known conditions. Last, but not least, is the general inability of empirical
models to provide fundamental insights into the behavior of complicated
systems or to provide a fundamental theoretical framework because
they do not correlate with the specific physical realities of the system
and generally rely on "equations of convenience" which !lave little or
no real scientific basis. The use of such equations may, in fact, make
the model susceptible to violating basic scientific principles, such as
conservation laws or the second law of thermodynamics. So we conclude
that empirical models, while having some advantages over qualitative
models, are also inadequate for producing the necessary interaction
between theory and experiment.
Theory-directed models, like empirical models, also have the
mathematical rigor for specificity and clarity in defining hypotheses
and are also analytically testable as to their behavior. Because they
are an attempt to model the physical reality of the system, they are
not as "data dependent" as empirical models. They can, therefore, predict
system behavior under new conditions as well as predict values of
experimentally inaccessible variables or parameters. They are capable
of exposing the contradictions in hypotheses as well as the contradictions
and/or incompleteness of data sets. Insomuch as they utilize mathematical descriptions based on or derived from basic scientific principles,
they can provide the fundamental theoretical structure for identifying
the "essentials" of the system and provide general insights and knowledge into the functioning of the system. Their biggest weaknesses have
been with their communicability, their difficulty of use, and their inadaptability. These are not so much inherent problems with theory-directed
models as they are with the specific mathematical and analytical
techniques that have been available to develop them. The most common
approach has been using differential equations and solving them. As
the models become more complex, this becomes a formidable task; solu-
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tions, if they can be obtained at all, become less and less transparent
and often must be analyzed by computer. Finally, if closed-form solutions
are not available, the problem is usually subjected to some numerical
analysis technique. Such models tend to be difficult to eliminate even
if they are shown to be incompatible with data, due to the labor involved
in their creation, and they also can be difficult to modify for the same
reason. Such techniques also require much time and effort to learn and
are difficult to master. What is needed is a new technique or approach
that can overcome these problems. Along with Chua (1969), we believe
it must be a compromise between simplicity and reality. Along with
Thorn (1975), we will often ask it to be qualitatively faithful before it
is made to be quantitatively so. His point, which needs to be taken
seriously, is that often the shape of a predicted curve has more significance toward acceptance or rejection of a model than whether or not
the model's prediction goes through one or more actual data points.
Also, if possible, it must be testable by the most stringent tests available.
We will have more to say about model verification later. Pictorial representations have always had value. If we can have a pictorial representation which also provides a paradigm for the analysis of holistic
behavior while relating the holistic behavior to the various functional
parts, we will have succeeded. We submit that the method we call
Network Thermodynamics can provide a common language to bridge
the gap between experimental and theoretical biology (Mikulecky 1983).
We will present later some of the reasons why we believe this to be
true. In the next sections we will discuss the current attitudes and
practices found in biological research and their historical perspective.

Current Attitudes and Practices
Researchers in physics and chemistry, for example, are compelled
to become familiar with both theoretical and experimental approaches.
In a physics department at any major university, one finds a reasonable
mix of theoreticians and experimentalists. The experimentalists have
the quantitative background necessary to understand the theories and
are expected to use them in designing and interpreting experiments.
Unfortunately, in the life sciences, empiricism is the most widely
accepted epistemology with only a very small subset of practicing
biologists adopting the theoretical approach to some extent. This imbalance between empiricism and theory in biology has produced a number
of serious and interrelated consequences.
Foremost, perhaps, is the growth of a literature full of data with
weak interpretation, if any at all. Yates (1979), a former editor of the
American Journal of Physiology, refers to it as," ... the routine, data-loaded
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papers without strong scientific context that constitute the bulk of those
published in any biological field." Another discouraging result of this
imbalance in biology is a communication gap of immense proportions
between experimentalists and theoreticians characterized in part by a
sense of isolation, frustration, and even distrust. The manifestations of
this are many, but there is one type in particular which illustrates the
closed-mindedness which has become almost fashionable as well as the
misunderstanding of the issues involved. Often, good-intentioned meeting organizers bring together theoreticians and experimentalists at a
meeting in the hope of breaking down the communication barriers and
establishing some sort of common ground. An event which is all too
common at such meetings is that after hearing some theoretical presentation, an experimentalist will introduce the talk he or she is about to
present with sincere reassurances to their counterparts in the audience
that the presentation is totally free of models and theory! The speaker
then proceeds to describe a model which is both weakly defined and
untestable, believing that the trap was really successfully escaped. This
is a cheap shot in a way, because the type of model the experimentalist
was avoiding was special,and the one inadvertently presented was so
poorly formulated that it hardly qualified. We must at least grant that
the distinction being made was valid.
It is important to realize that these attitudes are prevalent among
those who define modern biology by deciding where the funding will
go and by deciding who will be hired, promoted, and tenured as well
as what will eventually become part of the literature and what else
will go unpublished. That certain ideas, approaches, etc., are excluded
is a natural and obvious consequence of this imbalance. This leads to
the tendency for those who seek to pursue theoretical biology to be
forced to obtain funds and justification for their existence by modeling
the data produced by the "true" investigators-a more or less subservient service role. They are not asked to create theory, merely to model
data and to help get it published by giving it some appearance of having
been done for theoretical reasons. There is the suspicion that often
biology is chosen as a field of study precisely because it is lacking the
mathematical and theoretical rigor that seems so difficult to master in
the other sciences. Murphy (1982), in a presentation at a conference
on the Genetic Basis of the Epilepsies, comments on" ... the deplorable
divorce, between science and mathematics, that took place within the
century or so since scholars were first allowed to believe that it is
possible to be a serious scientist with an unsullied ignorance of
mathematics. This I hold to be a capital mistake, partly because ignorance of mathematics narrows perspective, but mainly because it betrays
what is the great strength of science, the mutually correcting influences
of coherence and rigor on the one hand and empirical fact on the other."
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A more subtle result of this imbalance, but possibly equally as serious,
is the creation of a kind of "work ethic" which places a high value on
activity relating to data collection but little value on time spent "thinking''
or developing theory. Many biological researchers are quite ready to
learn some very difficult physical, chemical, engineering, and mathematical concepts in order to apply them to the design, testing, calibration,
and use of instruments, but will think nothing of failing to do even the
most rudimentary modeling of their hypotheses and collected data. This
problem was stated very clearly by Rene Thorn (1979) when he commented on the possibility of experimentalists in biology testing predictions from Catastrophe Theory models: "... I feel that we should not
hurry for any 'experimental confirmation'; I think that a lot of theoretical
thinking, of speculative modeling, has to be done before one might
really start (our emphasis) to experiment to make a choice between
models. Even so, it is doubtful that these experiments would interest
very much present-day biologists, as they would be unable to understand
their motivation. Quite likely, there is very little which can be done
about the present situation: I agree with P Antonelli (Transplanting a
pure mathematician into theoretical biology, Proc. Con{ on Math., Stat.,
and the Environment. Ottawa 1974), when he states that theoretical
biology should be done in Mathematical Departments; we have to let
biologists busy themselves with their very concrete-but almost meaningless-experiments; in developmental biology, how could they hope
to solve a problem they cannot even formulate?"
This work ethic is tightly coupled to the most crippling omission
from the life of modern biologists, which is some guideline for judging
quality. In the more "exact" sciences, mathematical theories provide a
path from general truths to specific lines of investigation which are
often absent or which are at best applied in the above-mentioned limited
way in biology. The argument that it is justifiable to use animals in
research because the research ultimately eliminates human (and sometimes animal) suffering depends very much on the quality of that
research. There is certainly a legitimate case that can be made that
the almost completely empiricist approach prevalent in modern biology
cannot justify on the basis of quality the amount of money, resources,
and animals that it consumes. The ethical aspects of using animals
has been treated very adequately by others (Singer 1985).

A Brief Historical Perspective
The situation described to this point exists and it is the dominant
means of doing biological and, especially, biomedical research today.
How is it justified? How can it have happened? Gaylord Simpson once
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said that biology is the queen of all the sciences because it studies
levels of complexity beyond those studied by physics and chemistry. It
is the complexity of the living system that has been the reason so many
biologists do not believe that the development of theory which was so
integral in the practice of physics and chemistry could play the same
role in biology. Theories for dealing with most systems simply failed to
work in these complex systems. Both classical and nonequilibrium thermodynamics were chained to the "black box" approach to highly
organized systems. It can be argued most strongly that for the understanding of most biological systems these approaches are both
inadequate and inaccurate since they arose out of the conceptual
framework of the analysis of so called "simple" systems: those which
were homogeneous and relatively unstructured in their basic nature.
Th properly apply either classical or nonequilibrium thermodynamic
reasoning to organized systems, it is necessary to apply them at the
level of such homogeneous substructures and then use the proper
method for combining the substructures into a functional whole. Often,
what was to be called "theoretical biology" suffered from the problem
of "throwing out the baby with the bath water." In order to get solutions,
the mathematical and theoretical descriptions of biological systems
were oversimplified to the point of no longer being a meaningful description of the real biological systems.
The old question of whether or not life can be described in terms
of the principles of physics and chemistry has never been adequately
answered. The illusion is that physics and chemistry are complete and
all that biologists need to do is use their principles. Unfortunately, this
is not the case. There is one strong philosophical idea underlying all
of this: reductionism, the idea that by continuously subdividing a system
to subsystems and then studying the subsystems in detail, the properties
of the whole can be learned. Due to the dominant role of reductionism,
there is a wealth of particle physics done at the expense of a macroscopic
physics of highly organized systems. Chemistry through chemical
physics and physical chemistry follows suit. Thus modern biology (as
well as its predecessors) has one of two choices. Either we believe that
reducing living systems to parts totally describable by physics and
chemistry can explain everything or we resurrect vitalism. As in all
paradoxes, there is a truth hidden. In fact, vitalism and the missing
areas of modern physics and chemistry may be different ways of stating
the same idea: living systems, among other, highly organized hierarchical systems, need a holistic approach based on a more holistic science,
specifically one designed to deal with highly organized systems. The
development of this science will be a breakthrough in physics and
chemistry as well as biology. Meanwhile, theory and quantitative ideas
are accepted as useful only insomuch as they help the reductionist drive
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to look at smaller and smaller pieces of the organism in the hope of
understanding the whole more completely.
This process of reduction, so central to modern biology's mode of
operation, is often attributed to Descartes and it is often called "Cartesian Reductionism." It is possible that if Descartes were alive today he
would take strong issue with this identification. As well as being a
philosopher, Descartes was also a biologist and mathematician. In his
Rules for the Direction of the Mind, he exhorted that we need not
investigate "what others have thought nor what we ourselves conjecture,
but what we can intuit (our emphasis) clearly and evidently or deduce
with certainty, for there is no other way to acquire knowledge." This,
upon first examination seems to be a clear exhortation toward the
empiricists' approach. However, the fact that he put so much stock in
intuition must also be seen in the context of his ability to reason
mathematically. Given this ability, he could easily see the need for the
examination of the natural objects he sought to understand. But, where
would he have been without the mathematical background? Later in
the same work, he said, "Intuition is the undoubting conception of a
pure and attentative mind, which arises from the light of reason alone,
and which is more certain than deduction" (Kline 1980).
The so-called neo-romanticists, often identified with Theodore Roszak (Marx 1978), go far beyond this call for the use of intuition. Roszak
(1979) speaks in terms of a holistic epistemology based on the use of
human emotion as well as human reason to arrive at truth. While these
views are generally vigorously rejected within the scientific community,
we bring it up here because Roszak's holism is a reaction to the blind
reductionism seen among so much of modern science and technology
and as such makes a point which may be germane to the issue of animal
rights. Roszak (1979) states, "... it became permissible for the scientist
to admire the mechanical intricacy of nature, but not to love it as a
living presence endowed with a soul and reflecting a higher order of
reality. A machine can be studied zealously, but it cannot be loved."
The suggestion is that the reductionist view allows its advocates to
avoid facing the ethical questions by its mechanization and depersonalization of the objects of scientific investigation, especially those which
are alive.

An Example
Before moving on to Network Thermodynamics, we would like to
present an example to illustrate and summarize the various approaches
that we h·ave already presented. Suppose we present a television to a
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number of investigators (who have no previous knowledge of electronics)
and ask them to explain how the TV works. The totally empiricist
investigator would remove the back of the TV set and begin making
measurements of currents, voltages, resistances, etc., ad infinitum.
Given the complexity of a TV set (which is still far less than most
biological systems), it seems extremely unlikely, if not impossible, that
just collecting data will lead to an intuitive development of the network
theory needed to understand the holistic behavior of the many subcircuits working together or the physics of the individual solid state components. The totally reductionist investigator might start by smashing
the set with a sledge hammer and sorting out the pieces according to
size, color, shape, where they end up after density gradient centrifugation, etc. They might then look at the carbon, silicon, and germanium
crystals in an x-ray diffraction machine. However, a TV set, like many
biological systems, is hierarchical in its organization. It can also be
broken down along more functional lines, i.e., supplying power, amplifying signals, etc. The molecular or "cellular" detail may only be incidental
to understanding its function from this perspective. While something
of value may be learned about the components, it again seems virtually
impossible to understand how the TV works by ignoring the "circuit
schematic diagram." Finally, the investigator who totally uses theoretical deduction might watch the TV for a while and then go off and
devise a very complicated, formal mathematical theory to explain how
the TV works. While there may well be some very interesting general
knowledge that can be gained from the theory, the chances that the
theory will correlate well with what is actually going on inside the TV
is again extremely remote.
We would hope that by this time it is apparent that the best approach
is one which stresses the strong interaction of both theory and experiment. With this example we have the hindsight of knowing how the TV
and its components work. We understand that network theory, electromagnetic theory, and solid-state physics are all equally necessary to
fully comprehend how a modern TV works and perhaps we also have a
sense of the experimental input that went into the development of these
theories. The application of these theories to the design of new and
very complicated devices is now done in the electronics industry with
computers using circuit simulation programs. New ideas are first modeled this way before any bench work is done. When the model works,
then the device is built and tested and it is only when both the model
and the experimental device agree that the understanding is complete
and it goes into production. With this process in mind, we proceed to
Network Thermodynamics.
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Network Thermodynamics Modeling and Computer
Simulation
About a decade ago, two independent proposals were made (Peusner
1983; Oster et al. 1971) to utilize the techniques of network theory as a tool
to study complex interacting physicochemical systems such as those
encountered in the description of biophysical processes. The innovative
step was the realization that the formal structure of network theory
was a good representation for other physical theories-thermodynamics
in particular. In Network Thermodynamics, the topology of interactive
systems, such as those in biology, is represented by means of interconnected network elements which dissipate, store, supply, or convert
energy. In its "purest" sense it is an expansion of thermodynamic reasoning which uses concepts of topology, mainly graph theory, to include
the structure or morphology of a system in its thermodynamic properties. In simple language, it allows us to "put together" into a functioning
whole a lot of pieces we may have observed as parts of a complicated,
organized system. This model of the functioning whole allows us to
investigate the relationships between the whole and its parts. In a time
when reductionist thinking is so prevalent, this is a significant conceptual step.
Network Thermodynamics is the product of the combination of
thermodynamics with topological methods. It is important to realize
that Network Thermodynamics is therefore completely independent
from electronics and electrical network theory. In fact, electrical networks, which provide an excellent example of how the marriage of
topology with the properties of single elements can be so very productive,
can be considered as a special case of Network Thermodynamics in its
broadest definition. Given the influence of reductionism in the basic
sciences, it is perhaps not too surprising that the development of macroscopic approaches to highly organized, hierarchical systems became
the domain of the engineering disciplines and was developed there first.
In fact, it should be reassuring that this new approach readily and
naturally incorporates what has been done in the past. It is not necessary to unlearn what we already know to utilize the added power of
the network approach to organization. It is simply a matter of putting
our existing thermodynamic notions into a broader framework which
liberates us from most of the old constraints. Once we recognize, for
example, that transport systems in membranes are capable of being
phenomenologically described by Fick's law or a few, more complicated,
relations such as the Michaelis-Menten scheme, we have a class of
objects which are capable of being seen as "wired together" in a particular way in each distinct living system. A pattern develops and a network
theory of life processes quickly emerges in the same way that electronic
network theory evolved.
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In biology, we seek to identify and characterize functional units
that are typically more elusive than those in a TV and often must rely
more strongly on the obvious morphological or biochemical units as a
starting point in our analysis. The same reasoning leads to the recognition of an alternative generalization of the closure and conservation
properties we usually call Kirchhoff's laws when applied to electrical
networks. By examining the way the flows traverse a compartmentalized
tissue, a network of flows can be described which obeys a Kirchhoff flow
law, and by similarly noticing that the driving forces for biological
processes follow a closure property around closed loops in any system,
a Kirchhoff's force law arises.
If we notice that the transporter in a biological membrane, the
chemical reaction, and the electrical resistance are all alike in that
they are governed by some flow-force relation and are responsible for
dissipation in the system, we can begin to talk about a class of biological
network elements which we might call "dissipators." When inertial
effects are present, such as in the pulsatile movement of blood or its
change of direction in a curved blood vessel, an inductive form of energy
storage is present. In Network Thermodynamics, the point is that these
objects divide a system into thermodynamic elements since they each
handle energy in distinctly different ways and furthermore, there is a
small set of categories of objects which exhaust the ways in which
energy can be handled. Together with the topology, which includes the
conservation and closure properties we can now call Kirchhoff's flow
and force laws, the system is completely defined. What emerges is a
clear, simple, rigorous way to analyze any system with complex structure, especially living systems. Thus, a living system can be visualized
in terms of a schematic which consists of dissipators (resistors), storage
elements (capacitors), and so on.
So far, the emphasis has been implicitly focused on the formulation
of a description and analysis of the living system using Network Thermodynamics. This would only be a hope for the future if it were not for
the progress already made, mainly in circuit theory, in providing for
the analysis of such systems. For this purpose, a number of powerful
computer simulation programs have been created and provide a means
for such analysis. We currently use the circuit simulation program,
SPICE2, to solve our biological networks. Eventually new programs will
be created for biological simulation which will not require the translation
of the system's "schematic diagram" into a pseudo-electrical language
before they can be simulated. The use of these circuit simulation programs may lead to the notion that Network Thermodynamics is "merely
analog computing." Analog models, according to Jaynes (1976), are not
really scientific models in the sense that they do not necessarily act as a
hypothesis for explaining or understanding the object of study. "Instead,
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the analog is at every point generated by the thing it is an analog of."
If we accept this definition, it will be clear that the type of models we
are discussing resemble analogs very closely, but indeed are mainly
used to test hypotheses and do indeed aim at understanding or explaining the object of study. The scope and depth of Network Thermodynamics
far exceeds analog computing.
Network Thermodynamic modeling techniques offer many unique
advantages over other approaches currently in use. Network Thermodynamic simulation is easy enough to do to allow models to actually
be investigated by their originators and discarded or modified with
little loss in time or effort. Unlike techniques using only higher
mathematics, the fact that Network Thermodynamics rests on schematic
depictions of a system rather than an explicit formulation in terms of
equations makes it far more accessible to the non-theoretician, while
still retaining its complete mathematical rigor. It is intuitively easier
to visualize physical processes using the drawings of network theory
than the formalism of topology. The topology of networks adds a systematic method for specifying connections to the mathematics of physics
and chemistry, which are basically poor in these relations. And most
importantly, network theory provides algorithms for interconnecting
and representing functional systems, whether linear or nonlinear, reciprocal or not, and allows an infinite number of possibilities to represent
these systems on an organized basis. As such, networks serve to represent differential equations by discrete, computable algorithms. The availability of powerful (and cheap) circuit simulation computer programs,
which can represent thousands of interconnected points, puts the power
of network theory at the fingertips of practically anybody with an
imaginative application. Specifically, some of the fields in which Network
Thermodynamic modeling has begun to be used are the cellular pharmacokinetics of an anticancer drug, methotrexate (White 1979; White
and Mikulecky 1982), filtration in the glomerulus of the kidney (Oken
et al. 1981), whole body pharmacokinetics (Thakker et al. 1982), the
effects of insulin on glucose transport and metabolism in adipocytes
(May and Mikulecky 1982,1983), calcium uptake by the sarcoplasmic
reticulum (Feher and Briggs 1982), volume and salt flow in the rat
ileum (Fidelman and Mikulecky 1982) and kidney proximal tubule
(Thomas and Mikulecky 1978), and hormone regulation of ion transport
in cultured kidney epithelia (Fidelman and Mikulecky 1985).

Model Verification
One of the most brilliant scientists of our time was Aharon Katchalsky.
He was one of the prime movers in the quest for a method for modeling
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the complex organization found in living systems. The quest for him
as well as the quest for us ended with the discovery of Network Thermodynamics. Katchalsky was also a careful enough scientist to worry
about the ability to create useless, unverifiable models. One of his
fondest quotations was: "With four unknown parameters you can draw
an elephant. With a fifth, you can also wag his tail."
This concern is, in part, a valid one. Fortunately, a large amount
of work has now been done on the verification of models (Walter 1982:
Carson et al. 1983; Mikulecky 1981, 1983). By model verification, we
mean the evaluation of a model with respect to the uniqueness of its
representation of the real system and to the one-to-one correlation of
model parameters with the real system parameters at all the hierarchical levels in the model. So far, although this has already become a field
in its own right, the scope of the results obtained is very limited. The
kinds of models which are best evaluated by this body of work are linear
compartmental models of small size. In some of our latest work, we try
to show how Network Thermodynamics can bring in additional
mathematical constraints on models to help characterize them more
completely. Also, in those cases where more rigorous analytical methods
fail, parameter estimation is possible by trial and error methods using
simulation. Thus we can expect that Network Thermodynamics will
continue to serve to help evaluate models both by analytical methods
as well as simulation.

Concluding Remarks
In our discussion of Network Thermodynamics, we have focused
more on the conceptual framework of this approach than on a practical
"how to" guide. We refer the reader to Thakker et al. (1982), White
(1979), White and Mikulecky (1982), May and Mikulecky (1982), and
May and Mikulecky (1983) for some specific, and not too difficult examples of the application of these techniques. We would also welcome direct
contact with anyone interested in learning more about using Network
Thermodynamics. As a general rule, it is not our intent to become
"expert modelers" for others, but to teach and assist those who wish
to learn for themselves how to do theory-directed modeling using the
Network Thermodynamic approach.
The predominance of empiricism and reductionism in modern
biological and biomedical research has led to a situation where the
finite resources available are mainly used to generate an overabundance
of data with little, or no, real scientific meaning. This lack of a basic
theoretical foundation in biology also produces little real scientific
criteria for judging quality of research. In our opinion, the diversion of
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significant resources from experimental work into the development of
theory and theory-directed modeling will achieve a much better scientific
result from a considerably reduced number of experiments. It is our
belief that in Network Thermodynamics we have the necessary
framework to begin bridging the gap between theory and experiment
in biology.
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